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Introduction 
This paper focuses on growth in the CFA countries over the past few decades, and in the 
final part we also address issues of income distribution and poverty alleviation. In 
particular we investigate whether recent growth models explain the growth of CFA 
countries and, if so, what variables account for CFA growth performance. This is the 
subject of Part 1 of the paper. In Part 2 we investigate the trends and major fluctuations in 
CFA growth since 1971. In Part 3 we consider the evolution of income distribution, the 
share of the poorest 20 per cent in total income, and the growth of the average incomes of 
the poorest 20 per cent. In Parts 1 and 3, we use cross-country regressions instead of the 
panel-data method. The panel-data method is useful for deducing the short term 
relationship between variables, but the cross-country method reveals long-term 
relationships more accurately. Our interests here are the latter rather than the former. 
1 Growth  performance  in  an international context 
Table 1 shows regional averages of some economic measures for all developing 
countries, sub-Saharan Africa (excluding the CFA), BEAC and UEMOA. It is obvious 
that UEMOA-zone countries experienced rather poor economic performance in growth 
rates, even relative to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, and the BEAC-zone’s economies 
also grew slightly more slowly than the average of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Central 
government savings are much higher in BEAC and UEMOA not only than the rest of 
sub-Saharan Africa but also than the rest of developing countries. Since most developing 
countries have had substantially more inflation than the CFA countries, this statistic 
probably reflects the much lower levels of seigniorage revenue in the CFA. The 
difference between labour force growth and population growth is negative for the BEAC-
zone and UEMOA-zone countries, which indicates that demographic developments have 
been unfavourable for these countries’ economic performance. Whilst the BEAC 
countries experienced higher terms of trade growth than the average of developing 
countries, that of the UEMOA countries was negative but better than the average of the 
rest of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Table 1 







and UEMOA)  BEAC  UEMOA 
Economic growth (%), 1965-90  2.05  0.97  0.82  0.18 
Initial GDP per capita (log), 1965  8.09  7.31  7.46  7.17 
Openness, 1965-90  0.26  0.09  0.00  0.04 
Initial life expectancy (log), 1965  4.02  3.77  3.75  3.67 
Central govt savings, 1970-90  2.80  2.98  7.81  5.84 
Tropical climate  0.57  0.87  1.00  1.00 
Institutional quality, 1980  4.89  4.44  4.91  4.66 
Primary product exports/GDP, 1970  0.17  0.21  0.15  0.13 
Labour force growth minus population growth, 
1965-90 
0.38 -0.04  -0.25  -0.18 
Democracy, 1975  0.41  0.27  0.17  0.06 
Male schooling (secondary + higher), 1965  0.77  0.22  0.67  0.08 
Terms of trade growth, 1965-90  0.69  -1.15  2.71  -0.38 
 
Note: See Appendix 1 for details.   2
Table 2 shows the results of re-estimating two growth models—Bleaney and Nishiyama 
(2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997)—with dummy variables for sub-Saharan African 
regions. The sub-Saharan Africa dummy is statistically insignificant at the 10 per cent 
level in the Bleaney-Nishiyama model. Likewise, decomposing the sub-Saharan Africa 
dummy into the BEAC-zone, the UEMOA-zone, and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, none 
of these regional dummies is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. This body of 
evidence suggests that the independent variables included in the Bleaney-Nishiyama 
model—at least statistically—explain the regional uniqueness in economic growth rates 
of sub-sets of sub-Saharan Africa as well as the whole sub-Saharan Africa. In columns 3 
and 4, this exercise is repeated for the Sachs-Warner model. This model also fits sub-
Saharan Africa well, but the estimated coefficient on the BEAC zone dummy is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Table 3 shows the contribution of each independent variable to economic growth in 
OECD and sub-Saharan Africa, relative to other developing countries. We use the 
Bleaney-Nishiyama growth model to estimate the contribution of each independent 
variable to economic growth in the CFA countries compared with the rest of sub-Saharan 
Africa and other developing countries. Each independent variable was regressed on a 
constant, an OECD dummy and a sub-Saharan Africa dummy.1 The coefficients of these 
dummies indicate how the average level of each variable differs between the OECD, sub-
Saharan Africa and other developing countries. The estimated coefficient on each 
regional dummy was then multiplied by the coefficient of each regressor in the Bleaney-
Nishiyama model to derive the estimated growth effect. Then, to decompose sub-Saharan 
Africa, we also regressed each independent variable in the Bleaney-Nishiyama model on 
a constant, dummy variables for OECD, Non-CFA sub-Saharan Africa (NCFASSA), the 
BEAC-zone and the UEMOA-zone, and repeated the same calculation. Thus, for 
example, the +1.43 for per capita income for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) indicates how 
much faster SSA is predicted to grow than other developing countries (because of its low 
initial per capita income level). Sub-Saharan Africa has a strong advantage in initial low 
per capita income through the convergence effect (since there is a well-evidenced 
tendency that the lower the initial income, the faster the subsequent economic growth). 
On average, the convergence effect adds 1.5 percentage points to economic growth of 
sub-Saharan Africa. Budget management, proxied by central government savings, in sub-
Saharan Africa is better than in the other developing countries, and this adds 0.1 
percentage points to sub-Saharan Africa’s economic growth. However, sub-Saharan 
Africa performs very poorly in terms of the other explanatory variables, which offset 
good potential for rapid economic growth through the convergence effect. The low 
degree of democracy, the limited openness to international trade, and negative terms of 
trade growth each reduce growth by 0.3 percentage points. Sub-Saharan Africa does not 
suffer much from specialization in primary product exports or from low institutional 
quality, although these factors are important to OECD countries in offsetting the 
disadvantage of their high initial per capita incomes. The geographical disadvantage of 
sub-Saharan Africa is evident in the effects of tropical climate, which takes a quarter 
percentage point off the annual economic growth rate. The low stock of human capital, 
                                                 
1  In Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002), we included dummy variables for Latin America and Caribbean, and 
for East Asia as well as the OECD dummy and the sub-Saharan Africa dummy; therefore, these regions 
were compared with the rest of the world. However, in this investigation, we focus on values of 
economic measures for the CFA-zone countries of sub-Saharan Africa, relative to developing countries 
other than sub-Saharan Africa.    3
 
Table 2 
Growth models and the dummies for the African regions 
(Dependent variable: Annual average growth rate of PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita, 1965-90) 
  BN + SSA  BN + BEAC+ 
UEMOA + 
NCFASSA 





















































































































































Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. One asterisk (*), two asterisks (**) and three asterisks (***) designate 
statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent significance levels, respectively. Regressions 
labeled BN reproduce the model of Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002), and those labeled SW reproduce the model of 
Sachs and Warner (1997). For tropical climate, we use our own variable which amended measurement errors in 
Sachs and Warner’s original. A full list of the amendments is available from the authors on request. For life 
expectancy, we use log of life expectancy in 1965 in order to minimize any possible endogeneity problems, whilst 
we use the 1970 value for the Sachs-Warner model as they did in their paper.    4
Table 3 
Explaining regional difference in growth rates 
  OECD SSA 
Non-CFA 
SSA  BEAC UEMOA 
Comparative per capita 
GDP growth 
+0.63 -1.25 -1.07 -1.23 -1.87 
Independent variable       
Per capita income  -2.78  +1.43  +1.41  +1.24  +1.64 
Openness +1.04  -0.31  -0.28  -0.42  -0.35 
Life expectancy  +0.74  -0.87  -0.80  -0.86  -1.11 
Central Govt savings  -0.17  +0.09  +0.01  +0.03  +0.02 
Tropical climate  +0.38  -0.24  -0.21  -0.30  -0.30 
Institutional quality  +1.36 -0.12 -0.15 +0.01 -0.08 
Primary product 
exports/GDP 
+0.46 -0.03 -0.15 +0.11  +0.23 
Labour force growth 
minus population growth 
-0.15 -0.49 -0.44 -0.66 -0.58 
Democracy +0.05  -0.30  -0.20  -0.28  -0.62 
Male schooling  +0.31  -0.20  -0.21  -0.04  -0.26 
Terms of trade growth  -0.50 -0.26 -0.38  +0.42  -0.22 
 
Note: All numbers are relative to the omitted region (that is, developing countries except for sub-
Saharan Africa). Figures reflect the data for the full sample of countries (more than 100 for each 
variable, not just those used in the regression). 
 
represented by male schooling, costs 0.2 percentage point in sub-Saharan Africa’s annual 
growth rate. The greatest disadvantage for Africa’s economic growth is poor health, 
proxied by life expectancy, and large non-working population, proxied by labour force 
growth minus population growth. While the former reduces annual economic growth by 
0.87 percentage points, the latter takes off half a percentage point. 
The last three columns of Table 3 enable us to scrutinize the BEAC-zone and the 
UEMOA-zone countries. For most independent variables, the estimated figures of the 
BEAC and UEMOA regions are very close to those of the mean for sub-Saharan Africa, 
suggesting that the BEAC-zone countries, the UEMOA-zone countries and the rest of 
sub-Saharan Africa confront similar socio-economic problems in achieving faster 
economic growth. However, there are some notable differences between those three 
regions. For the BEAC-zone countries, the relative contributions of institutional quality, 
primary product exports, and terms of trade growth are positive, whilst those for the 
average of sub-Saharan Africa are negative. This is, however, more than offset by more 
negative openness and labour force growth. On the other hand, the growth rate of the 
UEMOA-zone countries is pulled down by poor performance in life expectancy, 
institutional quality and democracy, whilst their low dependence upon primary product 
exports relative to the other developing countries is estimated to have added 0.23 
percentage points to their annual economic growth rate. 
In general, what these results show is that the CFA countries are not very different from 
the rest of sub-Saharan Africa in the dimensions which seem to be important in 
determining growth rates. Although the growth rates of CFA countries have tended to be   5
slightly inferior to the SSA average, the difference is sufficiently small that the 
econometric models estimated on a large sample of countries also fit CFA countries. 
2  Trends and fluctuations in growth rates 
In this part of the paper we use data on real GDP growth in the six CFA countries for 
which a continuous series is reported in International Financial Statistics from 1971 to 
2000. The six countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon and the 
Republic of Congo. Although other sources give annual growth data for more CFA 
countries, the presumption must be that these data are less accurate. 
The most important single macroeconomic event during this period was the devaluation 
of January 1994. This was the only change of parity during the period, but it was a large 
one: the external value of the CFA Franc was halved. Consequently prices rose rapidly 
during 1994 (34 per cent on average), but also stabilized quickly (inflation was down to 
13 per cent in 1995 and under 5 per cent in 1996). It would appear that the currency was 
substantially overvalued in the years prior to devaluation, and that the devaluation 
achieved a significant corrective real exchange rate depreciation. Another potentially 
significant period was the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the prices of coffee, cocoa 
and oil moved up particularly sharply. Although cocoa prices fell rapidly after their peak 
in 1977, coffee and oil prices stayed high until the mid-1980s. 
In order to get a feel for how growth rates have evolved in the CFA, we regress the 
unweighted mean GDP growth rate of these six countries for each year on a constant, a 
time trend, and dummies for each complete five-year period. These five-year periods are 
constructed to run up to years ending in 3 and 8, so that the pre-devaluation period 1989-
93 constitutes one period and the immediate post-devaluation period 1994-98 another. 
The results of this regression are shown in Table 4. The first column shows the complete 
regression, in which only the dummies for 1979-83 (+) and 1989-93 (-) are significant 
(plus the constant). After sequentially eliminating the least significant variables, starting 
with the time trend, we end up with the second column, which still includes the 
insignificant 1994-98 dummy, and finally with the third column. This regression suggests 
that the growth rate of GDP has been fairly constant over the period, except for a period 
of exceptionally fast growth during the commodity boom of 1979-83, and a period of 
exceptionally slow growth immediately before devaluation (1989-93). If exchange rate 
overvaluation was the cause of this slow growth in the early 1990s, then devaluation was 
definitely expansionary for the CFA countries. We have also tested for terms-of-trade 
effects by including the real (French franc) price of cocoa in the model, but it emerges 
with an insignificant (and even slightly negative) coefficient. 
Table 5 shows the same regression as in the third column of Table 4 for the six countries 
individually. Several points stand out. One is that the growth rate of the individual 
countries is much more variable than that of the unweighted mean (the standard error of 
these regressions is more than twice as large in five out of six cases). This suggests that 
there are substantial uncorrelated output shocks across the CFA, which one would expect 
given the weight of agricultural production in the region. A second point is that all six    6
 
Table 4 
GDP growth of CFA countries 1971-2000 
Dependent variable  Unweighted six-country mean annual GDP growth (%) 
Independent variables      






Time trend  0.0037 
(0.06) 
  
Dummy 1974-78  −0.399 
(−0.30) 
  






Dummy 1984-88  −0.471 
(−0.37) 
  











R-squared  0.550 0.547  0.540 
Standard error  2.01 1.90  1.92 
 
Notes: The six countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon and the Republic of 
Congo. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
Table 5 
Growth regressions for individual countries 






1989-93 R-squared  Standard  error 
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Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.   7
countries have negative coefficients for the 1989-93 dummy, although the size of the 
coefficient varies widely. Finally, there is not the same consistency in the sign of the 
1979-83 dummy, which is positive for four countries but quite substantially negative for 
two. 
The main conclusions of this section are the following. The CFA countries have 
experienced roughly constant growth (though with substantial year-to-year fluctuations) 
since 1970, except for a period of fast growth around 1980 and slow growth in the early 
1990s. The latter shows up more consistently across countries, and was probably caused 
by real exchange rate overvaluation that was corrected by the devaluation of January 1994. 
The period of exceptionally fast growth was evident only in some countries and was most 
likely associated with commodity price booms. 
3  Poverty alleviation and income inequality 
In this section, we investigate poverty and inequality in the CFA-zone countries in the 
cross-country framework. We first construct an empirical model of the growth rate of the 
income of the poor. The most serious problem here, as elsewhere, is lack of data for the 
CFA-zone countries. This problem is particularly serious for the quintile shares of income 
and the Gini coefficient, which we use in our investigation. Therefore, instead of seeking 
sub-Saharan Africa models or CFA-zone models, we construct cross-country models 
from global data of poverty and income inequality, which explain the characteristics of 
CFA-zone countries as well. 
Our investigation in this section uses two types of income inequality data: (1) the Gini 
coefficients of income distribution, and (2) the poorest quintile’s income shares of the 
total income of the economy. The most popular measure of income inequality is the Gini 
coefficient, which represents the entire distribution of income. The most comprehensive 
cross-country data of the Gini coefficients are perhaps WIDER WIID (World Income 
Inequality Database). We use version 1.0, the latest version of the database, which was 
last updated on 12 September 2000. This database incorporates Deininger and Squire’s 
(1996) dataset of income inequality (the Gini coefficients of income distribution), which 
is another popular dataset. The WIID covers a large number of countries within a 
reasonable time period. Yet, it is a collection of data from various data sources rather than 
a synthesized dataset. In some cases the dataset provides multiple data for an identical 
country for an identical year with several data definitions, but for other country samples it 
includes a large number of blanks. Therefore, even for the identical country for the 
identical year, the choice of numbers depends on researchers’ purposes and sensitivity 
(see Data Appendix 1).2  The WIID database differentiates ‘reliable’ data from ‘less 
reliable’ data. We always chose ‘reliable’ data if it was available. To maintain 
consistency, we also always chose data of national coverage and ignored those of rural or 
urban coverage only. 
                                                 
2  As a consequence, recent empirical studies (Knowles 2001; Odedokun and Round 2001; Sylwester 
2000, 2001) on income inequality provide appendices of the actual figures of inequality data used in the 
research, as we do.   8
We are aware that the comparison between data of different definitions (for example, 
income-based or expenditure-based) is far from ideal. Because of redistribution through 
taxation, expenditure-based Gini coefficients give the impression of less inequality than 
income-based data. Nevertheless gross-income data are most frequently used in 
international comparison because of their wider availability, and we give preference to 
these data for the same reason. In the absence of gross-income data, we use data based on 
net incomes. Expenditure data were least willingly accepted. 
Deininger and Squire (1996) report that, from reliable data, the ‘mean difference between 
income-based and expenditure-based Gini coefficients is about 6.6’ (p. 582) whilst the 
difference between other reference units is not significantly important. This is not fully 
satisfactory, but there is no obvious alternative.3 
The other data on income inequality that we use are the poorest quintile’s share of total 
income. Since WIDER WIID does not provide data on income shares, we derive them 
from Deininger and Squire’s 1997 database. This dataset is an updated version (by adding 
more data from African countries) of their original dataset (Deininger and Squire 1996). 
Just like the Gini coefficients in WIID, the data on income shares in Deininger and Squire 
(1997) do not measure the same dimension of inequality in every country. Therefore, the 
choice of data, again, depends on the researchers’ purposes and decisions. The criteria 
that we employed are basically the same as those for the Gini coefficients (see Data 
Appendix 2). No data adjustment was made for the income shares data since no reliable 
method of transformation for income shares of different data units exists. Observations of 
the closest years to 1965 and 1990 were chosen for our dataset.4  
Note that a high (low) value in the Gini coefficient of income distribution means more 
(less) inequality, whilst a high (low) value in the income share of the poorest 20 per cent 
of the population indicates a less (more) unequal society. In a given empirical model 
specification, the expected sign of coefficients on these two measures are opposite to 
each other. To make the signs of coefficients on these inequality measures more 
consistent, we constructed an income equality index by subtracting the Gini coefficients 
(in a 100 point-scale) from 100. Therefore, both the income equality index and the 
income share of the poorest 20 per cent of the population score higher in a more equal 
society compared to a less equal society. Thus, hereafter, we use the income equality 
index—rather than the Gini coefficients—and the income shares of the poorest quintile as 
our two measures of income inequality. 5   Furthermore, in constructing the change 
                                                 
3  The WIDER WIID (2000) WWW Guide (available from http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiiddoc.htm) 
reports that ‘Gini coefficients of gross incomes are roughly 5-10 points higher than Gini coefficients of 
net (disposable) incomes, and Gini coefficients of (net) earnings may be roughly 5 points higher than 
Gini coefficients of (net) expenditure. Gini coefficients of disposable incomes may also be roughly 5 
points higher than Gini coefficients of expenditure’. However, it is not clear whether these estimates are 
based on actual calculation or just casual observation. Further, it is not mentioned whether these 
estimates were derived from reliable data only or from all data including less reliable data.  
4  For some countries, however, available points of time are not abundant. We allowed the data of the Gini 
coefficients and of the income share of the poor to have up to a seven and eight year margin, 
respectively, before or after each of the years concerned (1965 and 1990). These allowances are 
justified, considering that the Gini coefficients and income shares do not dramatically change over time 
and that losing observations due to an intolerance of time lag would be equally inappropriate.  
5  Equivalently, one can call these variables measures of income equality.   9
variables (annual average growth rates of the income equality index and of the income 
share of the poor) for our concerned period 1965-90, the actual difference in years 
between the initial observation and the final observation was used, instead of simply 
assuming the difference was twenty-five years for all countries. 
We define the poor as the lowest quintile group and calculate the income of the poor and 
its growth rate as follows. If Y is the total income of an economy with population N, and 
YP is the aggregate income of those defined as poor, whose population is NP, then the 
average income of a poor person may be decomposed as follows: 
  (YP/NP) = (YP/Y) ×  (N/NP) ×   (Y/N)      (1) 
Equation (1) says that the average income of the poor equals their share of total income, 
divided by their share of population, multiplied by average per capita income. If the share 
of the poor in total population is defined to be constant over time (as here), then taking 
logarithms and differentiating with respect to time, we get: 
  d[ln(YP/NP)]/dt = d[ln(YP/Y)]/dt + d[ln (Y/N)]/dt       (2) 
which says that the rate of growth of the average incomes of the poor equals the rate of 
growth of their income share plus the rate of growth of average per capita incomes. We 
take (NP/N) to be 0.2, and use data on the other two terms in (1) for 1965 and 1990 (or 
dates as close as possible to these in the case of YP/Y) to calculate the growth rate of 
YP/Y. 
In Table 6, in order to investigate poverty and inequality in the CFA-zone countries, we 
first constructed a cross-country model of the growth rate of the income of the poor. The 
first column shows our preferred model. The coefficient on the income share of the 
poorest quintile is statistically significant and has a negative sign, suggesting that the 
lower the initial income share of the poor, the faster the growth of the income of the poor. 
Equally interestingly, initial per capita income has a significant and negative coefficient, 
indicating that poorer countries tend to improve the income of the poor faster than richer 
countries. The estimated coefficient on openness to international trade is positive and 
significant at the 1 per cent level. This effect most likely reflects the strong correlation 
between openness and economic growth, so that the poor benefit from openness through 
economic growth. Life expectancy, measured at the beginning of the concerned period, is 
positive and highly significant. This suggests that investment for health in hygiene and 
hospitals is an effective policy to combat poverty. Central government savings, which is a 
key determinant of growth as shown in Table 2, helps the poor improve their income by 
enlarging the whole economy. Tropical climate and the size of primary product exports 
(measured as the ratio to GDP) have negative coefficients. This most likely reflects 
findings in Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) that countries under a tropical climate and 
with high dependency on primary product exports experience slow economic growth. An 
interesting result is that the estimated coefficient on ethno-linguistic diversity, which was 
found to have a negative correlation with economic growth in Easterly and Levine 
(1997), has a small but positive coefficient here.6 Our speculative explanation for this is 
                                                 
6  The statistical significance of ethno-linguistic diversity is not because many poor countries are 
ethnically divided. Such an effect is captured by a variable of per capita income since it is included in 
the regression.    10
 
Table 6 
Growth rate of the income of the poor 
(Dependent variable: annual average growth rate of PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita of the 
poor, 1965-90) 

























































Sub-Saharan Africa dummy    -1.03 
(-1.63) 
 





































Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. Figures in square brackets are p-ratios. One asterisk (*), two 
asterisks (**) and three asterisks (***) designate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. For life expectancy, we use log of life expectancy in 
1965 in order to minimize any possible endogeneity problems. Ramsey’s RESET is used to test 
the functional form.   11
that ethnically diverse countries more likely distribute their wealth in order to maintain 
political stability. Further, four diagnostic tests have been conducted. The model passes 
serial correlation, normality and heteroscedasticity tests, but fails the functional form test. 
However, since inequality-related data are deemed to be subject to large measurement 
errors, one should not be oversensitive to the test results here. In columns 2 and 3, a 
dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa and a dummy for the CFA-zone countries are 
added to our preferred model. These two dummies are respectively not significant even at 
the 10 per cent level, suggesting that this model statistically explains differentials in the 
growth rate of the income of the poor in sub-Saharan Africa and the CFA-zone countries. 
Table 7 
Change in the income share of the poor 
(Dependent variable: annual average change in the income share of the poorest quintile, 1965-90) 





































Sub-Saharan Africa dummy    -0.052* 
(-1.98) 
 












































Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. Figures in square brackets are p-ratios. One asterisk (*), two 
asterisks (**) and three asterisks (***) designate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. For life expectancy, we use log of life expectancy in 
1965 in order to minimize any possible endogeneity problems. Ramsey’s RESET is used to test 
the functional form.    12
In Table 7, we constructed an empirical model to investigate the change in the income 
share of the poor. The estimated coefficients on the initial income share of the poor and 
per capita income are negative. They show that the more unequal and the poorer the 
country is, the faster the income share of the poor increases. Central government savings 
have a positive and significant coefficient. Sound management of government budgets 
probably reflects a dimension of capability of the government, which may influence 
efficient policy management to handle income inequality. The coefficient on the initial 
fertility ratio is negative, indicating that high fertility is a more serious obstacle for the 
poor to improve their standard of living than the rich. Ethno-linguistic diversity is 
positively correlated with change in the income share of the poor, suggesting that an 
ethnically diverse society is more enthusiastic over income distribution. The model 
passes three out of four diagnostic tests, but does not succeed in the heteroscedasticity 
test. If a dummy for sub-Saharan Africa is added to the regression, it is significant but 
only at the 10 per cent level (p-ratio=0.054). The model is robust to the addition of the 
CFA-zone dummy.  
 
Table 8 
Changes in the equality index 
(Dependent variable: annual average change in the equality index, 1965-90) 

























Sub-Saharan Africa dummy    -0.25** 
(-2.47) 
 










































Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. Figures in square brackets are p-ratios. One asterisk (*), 
two asterisks (**) and three asterisks (***) designate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. For fertility ratio, we use log of fertility ratio in 1965 in 
order to minimize any possible endogeneity problems.   13
Finally, in Table 8, we show an empirical model which explains international differences 
in changes in income inequality between 1965 and 1990, as measured by Gini 
coefficients. Tropical climate and initial fertility are the only significant independent 
variables. The estimated coefficients on tropical climate and initial fertility are both 
negative, suggesting that countries under a tropical climate and with high fertility rates 
tend to experience slower improvement in income equality. The model passes three 
diagnostic tests, but does not pass the heteroscedasticity test. The model is robust to the 
addition of the CFA-zone dummy but not to sub-Saharan Africa dummy. 
4 Conclusions 
The main conclusion from our paper is that existing growth models are capable of 
explaining the growth of CFA countries, as well as of other SSA countries. The factors 
which contribute to the slow growth of the CFA over the 1965-90 period are much the 
same as for other SSA countries. There is no significant trend in CFA growth rates since 
1970, but there have been periods of particularly high growth (around 1980) and slow 
growth (in the years before the January 1994 devaluation). Cross-country models of the 
growth of the income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population, and the change in 
equality (or the poor’s income share) fit the CFA as well, in the sense that a CFA dummy 
is insignificant when added to these regressions. 
   14
Data Appendix 1. Gini coefficients 
Country name  Gini circa 1965  Data description 
Gini circa 1965 
Gini circa 1990  Data description 
Gini circa 1990 
Argentina  42 (1961)  G, P, ?, AP   48 (1989)  G, P, M, AP 
Australia  32 (1967)*  G, P, AA, AP  41.72 (1990)*   G, H, AA, AP 
Austria  29.3 (1970)*  G, P, AA, IR  31.6 (1987) *  SPDS 
Bahamas  48.41 (1970)*  G, H, AA, AP  41.83 (1991)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Bangladesh  34.34 (1966)*  G, H, AA, AP  37 (1986)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Barbados  36.2 (1962)  I, P, AA, T  NA   
Belgium  36.37 (1969)*  G, H, AA, T  31.9455 (1992)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Benin  42 (1959)  G, P, AA, AP  NA   
Bolivia  53 (1968)*  G, P, AA, AP  42.04 (1990)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Botswana  57.4 (1971)  I, P, AA, EA  54.21 (1986)*  E, H, AA, AP 
Brazil  57.61 (1970)*  G, H, AA, AP  60.6 (1990)*  G, HC, AA, AP 
Bulgaria  22.23 (1965)*  G, P, AA, AP  24.53 (1990)*  SPDS 
Canada  31.61 (1965)*  G, H, AA, AP  35.0807 (1991)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Chad  35 (1958)  G, P, AA, AP  NA   
Chile  45.64 (1968)*  G, H, AA, AP  54.7 (1990)*  G, H, AA, AP 
China  30.5 (1964)*  G, H, AA, AP  34.6 (1990)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Colombia  62 (1964)*   G, P, AA, AP  51.32 (1991)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Costa Rica  50 (1969)*  G, P, AA, AP  46 (1989)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Côte d’Ivoire  51.7 (1970)  I, P, AA, EA  36.9 (1988)*  E, HC, AA, AP 
Cuba  28.114 (1962)  G, P, AA, IR  NA   
Czechoslovakia 22.6  (1965)*  N,  HC, AA, AP  20.1 (1988)*  SPDS 
Denmark  24.908 (1966)*  G, H, AA, AP  39 (1990)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Dominican Republic  45.5 (1969)  G, P, AA, AP  51 (1989)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Ecuador  38 (1968)*  G, P, AA, AP  50 (1993)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Egypt  40 (1965)*  E, H, AA, AP  32 (1991)*  E, HC, AA, AP 
El Salvador  53 (1965)*  G, P, AA, AP  53 (1994)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Fiji  46 (1968)*  G, P, AA, AP  NA   
Finland  34.2 (1966)*  G, H, AA, AP  25.5 (1990)*  G, H, AA, AP 
France  47 (1965)*  G, H, AA, AP  37.2 (1984)*  G, HC, AA, AP 
Gabon  64 (1960)*  G, P, AA, AP  NA   
Germany, West  38 (1964)*  N, H, AA, AP  26 (1990)*  N, H, AA, AP 
Greece  44.1 (1965)  I, P, AA, T  35.16 (1988)*  E, H, AA, AP 
Guatemala  29.96 (1966)  I, H, R, IR  59.06 (1989)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Honduras  61.88 (1968)*  G, H, AA, AP  54 (1990)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Hong Kong  49 (1966)*  G, H, AA, AP  45 (1991)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Hungary  22.91 (1967)*  N, P, AA, AP  20.42 (1991)*  N, HC, AA, AP 
India  31.14 (1965)*  E, P, AA, AP  29.69 (1990)*  SPDS 
Indonesia  33.3 (1964)*  E, P, AA, AP  33.18 (1990)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Iran  41.88 (1969)*  E, P, AA, AP  42.9 (1984)  E, P, AA, AP 
Ireland  36.7 (1973)  N, H, AA, AP  35.2 (1987)*  SPDS 
Israel  37.08 (1961)*  I, P, AA, T  45.3 (1992)*  I, P, AA, AP 
Italy  40 (1967)*  N, H, AA, AP  32.5 (1991)*  SPDS 
Jamaica  41.272 (1971)  E, H, AA, AP  41.1 (1991)*  E, HC, AA, AP 
Japan  34.8 (1965)*  G, H, AA, AP  35 (1990)*  G, H, AA, AP   15
Kenya  63 (1964)  I, P, AA, T  57.5 (1992)*  E, HC, AA, AP 
Korea, Republic of  34.34 (1965)*  G, H, AA, AP  33.64 (1988)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Lebanon  55 (1960)*  G, P, AA, AP  NA   
Madagascar  53 (1960)*  G, P, AA, AP  46 (1993)*  E, HC, AA, AP 
Malawi  45.2 (1969)  I, P, AA, IR  62 (1993)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Malaysia  48.3 (1967)*  G, H, AA, AP  48.35 (1989)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Mexico  55.5 (1963)*  G, H, AA, AP  53.09 (1989)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Morocco  50 (1965)  G, P, AA, AP  39.2 (1991)*  E, HC, AA, AP 
Myanmar  35 (1958)  G, P, AA, AP  NA   
Netherlands, The  35.4 (1967)*  N, H, AA, T  29.3846 (1991)*  N, HC, AA, AP 
New Zealand  57.7 (1965)  I, P, AA, T  40.21 (1990)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Niger  34 (1960)*  G, P, AA, AP  36.1 (1992)*  E, HC, AA, AP 
Nigeria  57.94 (1970)*  N, P, AA, T  41.15 (1992)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Norway  36.04 (1967)*  N, H, AA, AP  33.31 (1991)*  SPDS 
Pakistan  35.51 (1966)*  G, H, AA, AP  32.38 (1988)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Panama  48 (1969)*  G, P, AA, AP  57 (1989)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Peru  61 (1961)*  G, H, AA, AP  46.43 (1991)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Philippines  50.5 (1965)*  G, H, AA, AP  47.7 (1991)*  SPDS 
Poland  26 (1965)  I, P, AA, AP  31 (1990)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Portugal  40.58 (1973)  N, H, AA, AP  36.76 (1990)*  N, H, AA, AP 
Puerto Rico  52.32 (1969)*  G, H, AA, AP  50.86 (1989)*  SPDS 
Senegal  56 (1960)*  G, P, AA, AP  54.12 (1991)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Sierra Leone  56 (1968)*  G, P, AA, AP  62.9 (1989)*  E, HC, AA, AP 
Singapore  49.83 (1966)*  G, P, AA, EP  39 (1989)*  G, H, AA, AP 
South Africa  56 (1965)  I, P, AA, AP  63 (1990)*  G, HC, AA, AP 
Spain  31.99 (1965)*  G, H, AA, AP  32.99 (1991)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Sri Lanka  47 (1963)*  G, H, AA, AP  46.7 (1987)*  SPDS 
Sudan  38.72 (1968)*  G, H, AA, AP  NA   
Surinam  30 (1962)*  G, P, AA, AP  NA   
Sweden  37.9242 (1967)*  G, H, AA, AP  31.112 (1992)*  SPDS 
Taiwan  32.43 (1966)*  N, P, AA, AP  30.11 (1990)*  SPDS 
Tanzania  54 (1964)*  G, P, AA, AP  59.01 (1991)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Thailand  42.9 (1968)*  G, H, AA, AP  48.8 (1990)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Trinidad and Tobago  53.9 (1971)  G, H, AA, AP  40.3 (1992)  I, HC, AA, AP 
Tunisia  42.3 (1965)*  E, P, AA, AP  41 (1990)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Turkey  56 (1968)*  G, H, AA, AP  44.09 (1987)*  G, H, AA, AP 
Uganda  40.7 (1970)  I, P, AA, AP  40.78 (1992)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Ukraine  24.6 (1968)*  I, P, AA, EP  24.4 (1989)*  I, P, AA, EP 
United Kingdom  24.3 (1965)*  N, H, AA, AP  32.3 (1990)*  SPDS 
United States  34.64 (1965)*  G, H, AA, AP  37.8 (1990)*  SPDS 
Uruguay  44.9 (1967)  I, H, AA, AP  NA   
USSR  26.2 (1968)*  I, P, AA, EP  27.2 (1989)*  I, P, AA, EP 
Venezuela  42 (1962)  G, P, AA, AP  44.4 (1990)*  G, P, AA, AP 
Yugoslavia  30.6 (1965)*  G, P, AA, IR  31.88 (1990)*  SPDS 
Zambia  79.5 (1970)  I, P, AA, IR  43.51 (1991)*  E, P, AA, AP 
Zimbabwe  66.27 (1968)  I, P, AA, IR  56.83 (1990)*  E, P, AA, AP 
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Note: Figures in brackets are the years of observations. In the second and the fourth columns, 
an asterisk ‘*’ indicates that the data are categorized as reliable data in our dataset. Data 
were categorised as reliable in our dataset if they satisfied both of the two criteria: (1) data are 
categorized as ‘reliable data’ in the WIID; (2) A gap between the year of observation and the 
year of concern (1965 or 1990) is no more than 5 years. In columns of data description, 
income definition, reference unit, area coverage and population coverage are shown in order. 
(1) Income definition: G = Gross income; N = Net income; I = other income, or no information 
on the type of income is available; E = Expenditure. (2) Reference unit: H = Household; P = 
Person; HC = Household per capita. (3) Area coverage: AA = All area; M = Metro Area; R = 
Rural area; ? = no information given. (4) Population coverage: AP = All population; IR = 
Income recipients; T = Tax payers; EA = Economically active population; EP = Employed 
population. In the fifth column, SPDS means that the data around 1990 are from the Same 
Primary Data Source of the data around 1965 and also the data share the identical data 
definition with the data employed for 1965. When data circa 1990 is available and data circa 
1965 is not available, such country samples were not included in our dataset for the nature of 
our analysis. The figures shown are pre-adjustment values. For our analysis, +6.6 was added 
to the figures shown, if income definition is expenditure. Our income equality indices were 
constructed by [100 – Gini coefficient]. As for the change variables, which we created for the 
dependent variables, only if all the data used in the calculation are reliable data, the created 
figures were categorized as reliable data; otherwise, the created figures were included only in 
the largest possible sample.   17
Data Appendix 2. The poorest quintile’s income share of the total income 
Country name  Poorest quintile’s 
income share 
circa 1965 
Data description  Poorest quintile’s 




Argentina  0.0700 (1961)  I, P, AA  NA   
Australia  0.0699 (1969)*  G, H, AA  0.0460 (1990)*  SPDS 
Austria  0.0680 (1970)  G, P, AA  0.0690 (1987)  SPDS 
Bahamas  0.0288 (1970)*  G, H, AA  0.0389 (1991)*  G, H, AA 
Bangladesh  0.0690 (1963)*  G, H, AA  0.0950 (1989)*  E, P, AA 
Benin  0.0800 (1959)  G, P, AA  NA   
Bolivia  0.0350 (1968)  G, P, AA  0.0562 (1990)*  E, P, AA 
Brazil  0.0320 (1960)*  G, H, AA  0.0248 (1989)*  G, P, AA 
Bulgaria  0.1036 (1965)*  G, P, AA  0.1054 (1990)*  SPDS 
Canada  0.0713 (1965)*  G, H, AA  0.0754 (1990)*  G, H, AA 
Chad  0.0800 (1958)  G, P, AA  NA   
Chile  0.0450 (1968)*  G, H, AA  0.0370 (1989)*  I, P, AA 
Colombia  0.0698 (1970)*  G, H, AA  0.0360 (1991)*  G, P, AA 
Costa Rica  0.0620 (1961)*  G, H, AA  0.0400 (1989)*  G, P, AA 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.0800 (1959)  G, P, AA  0.0678 (1988)*  E, P, AA 
Czechoslovakia 0.1010  (1965)*  N, P, AA  0.1086 (1991)*  G, P, AA 
Denmark  0.0500 (1963)  G, P, AA  0.0548 (1992)*  G, H, AA 
Ecuador  0.0630 (1968)  G, P, AA  0.0536 (1994)*  E, P, AA 
El Salvador  0.0550 (1965)  G, P, AA  NA   
Fiji  0.0400 (1968)  G, P, AA  NA   
Finland  0.0780 (1966)*  N, P, AA  0.0778 (1991)*  N, H, AA 
France  0.0190 (1962)  G, P, AA  0.0658 (1984)  G, H, AA 
Gabon  0.0200 (1960)  G, P, AA  NA   
Germany  0.1053 (1963)*  N, H, AA  0.0659 (1984)  G, H, AA 
Greece  0.0900 (1957)  G, P, AA  0.0619 (1988)*  E, H, AA 
Honduras  0.0160 (1968)*  G, H, AA  0.0384 (1992)*  G, P, AA 
Hong Kong  0.0570 (1971)  G, H, AA  0.0489 (1991)*  G, H, AA 
Hungary  0.1010 (1967)*  N, P, AA  0.0667 (1991)*  N, H, AA 
India  0.0880 (1965)*  E, P, AA  0.0910 (1990)*  SPDS 
Iraq  0.0200 (1956)  G, P, AA  NA   
Ireland  0.0480 (1973)  N, H, AA  0.0493 (1987)*  N, H, AA 
Jamaica  0.0470 (1958)  G, H, AA  0.0598 (1990)*  E, P, AA 
Japan  0.0662 (1965)*  G, H, AA  0.0590 (1982)  SPDS 
Korea  0.0900 (1966)  G, P, AA  NA   
Korea, Republic of  0.0580 (1965)*  G, H, AA  0.0739 (1988)*  G, H, AA 
Lebanon  0.0300 (1960)  G, P, AA  NA   
Madagascar  0.0390 (1960)  G, P, AA  0.0585 (1993)*  E, P, AA 
Malaysia  0.0400 (1970)*  G, H, AA  0.0458 (1989)*  G, P, AA 
Mexico  0.0360 (1963)*  G, H, AA  0.0320 (1989)*  G, P, AA 
Morocco  0.0710 (1965)  G, P, AA  0.0657 (1991)*  E, P, AA 
Myanmar  0.1000 (1958)  G, P, AA  NA   
Netherlands, The  0.0400 (1962)  G, P, AA  0.0692 (1991)*  N, H, AA 
New Zealand  0.0680 (1973)  G, H, AA  0.0458 (1990)*  SPDS 
Niger  0.0780 (1960)  G, P, AA  0.0748 (1992)*  E, P, AA   18
Nigeria  0.0700 (1959)  G, P, AA  0.0660 (1992)*  E, P, AA 
Norway  0.0556 (1967)*  N, H, AA  0.0540 (1991)*  SPDS 
Pakistan  0.0916 (1969)*  E, H, AA  0.0840 (1991)*  E, P, AA 
Panama  0.0180 (1970)*  G, H, AA  0.0200 (1989)*  G, P, AA 
Peru  0.0400 (1961)  G, P, AA  0.0620 (1986)*  E, P, AA 
Philippines  0.0350 (1965)*  G, H, AA  0.0520 (1988)*  G, P, AA 
Portugal  0.0575 (1973)  N, H, AA  0.0570 (1990)*  N, H, AA 
Puerto Rico  0.0180 (1969)*  G, H, AA  0.0290 (1989)*  SPDS 
Senegal  0.0300 (1960)  G, P, AA  0.0350 (1991)*  E, P, AA 
Sierra Leone  0.0276 (1968)  G, H, AA  NA   
South Africa  0.0190 (1965)  G, P, AA  0.0202 (1993)*  G, H, AA 
Spain  0.0715 (1965)*  G, H, AA  0.0839 (1989)*  E, H, AA 
Sri Lanka  0.0445 (1963)*  G, H, AA  0.0892 (1990)*  E, P, AA 
Sudan  0.0824 (1968)*  G, H, AA  NA   
Surinam  0.1070 (1962)  G, P, AA  NA   
Sweden  0.0420 (1967)*  N, H, AA  0.0740 (1990)*  N, H, AA 
Taiwan  0.0784 (1966)*  N, P, AA  0.0776 (1990)*  SPDS 
Tanzania  0.0480 (1964)  G, P, AA  0.0685 (1993)*  E, P, AA 
Thailand  0.0800 (1962)*  G, H, AA  0.0400 (1990)*  G, H, AA 
Trinidad  0.0194 (1971)  G, H, AA  NA   
Tunisia  0.0570 (1965)*  E, P, AA  0.0586 (1990)*  E, P, AA 
Turkey  0.0300 (1968)*  G, H, AA  0.0524 (1987)*  G, H, AA 
United Kingdom  0.0987 (1965)*  N, P, AA  0.0778 (1990)*  SPDS 
United States  0.0520 (1965)*  G, H, AA  0.0460 (1990)*  SPDS 
Venezuela  0.0360 (1971)  G, P, AA  0.0361 (1990)*  I, P, AA 
Yugoslavia  0.0821 (1963)*  G, H, AA  0.0733 (1990)*  G, P, AA 
Zambia  0.0630 (1959)  G, P, AA  0.0557 (1991)*  E, P, AA 
 
Note: Figures in brackets are the years of observations. In the second and the fourth columns, 
an asterisk ‘*’ indicates that the data are categorized as reliable data in our data set. Data were 
categorized as reliable if they satisfied both of the two criteria: (1) data are categorized as 
‘reliable data’ in Deininger and Squire (1997); (2) A gap between the year of observation and 
the year of concern (1965 or 1990) is no more than 5 years. In columns of data description, 
income definition, reference unit, and area coverage are shown in order. (1) Income definition: 
G = Gross income; N = Net income; I = other income, or no information on the type of income is 
available; E = Expenditure. (2) Reference unit: H = Household; P = Person. (3) Area coverage: 
AA = All area. No information on population coverage is available from Deininger and Squire 
(1997). In the fifth column, SPDS means that the data around 1990 are from the Same Primary 
Data Source of the data around 1965 and also the data share the identical data definition with 
the data employed for 1965. When data circa 1990 is available and data circa 1965 is not 
available, such country samples were not included in our dataset for the nature of our analysis. 
As for the change variables, which we created for the dependent variables, only if all the data 
used in the calculation are reliable data, the created figures were categorized as reliable data; 
otherwise, the created figures were included only in the largest possible sample.   19
Appendix 1. Descriptions of variables and data sources 
Variable  Data source  Variable designation in source 
[Largest possible sample] Annual 
average change in the income equality 
index for 1965-90, 100 scale 
Authors, 
Created from 
Deininger and Squire (1997) 
CQ1HLP 
[Largest possible sample] Initial income 
share of the poor circa 1965, 100 scale 
Authors, 
Created from 
Deininger and Squire (1997) 
Q1HLP 
[Largest possible sample] Annual 
average growth rate of the income of the 
poor for 1965-90 
Authors 
Created from 
Deininger and Squire (1997) 
and Sachs and Warner (1997) 
GRPILP 
[Largest possible sample] Initial income 




Deininger and Squire (1997) 
LPI65LP 
[Largest possible sample] Annual 
average change in the income equality 
index for 1965-90, 100 scale 
Authors, 
Created from 
WIDER WIID  
CEQLP 
[Largest possible sample] Initial income 
equality circa 1965, 100 scale 
Authors, 
Created from 
WIDER WIID  
EQ65LP 
Central government savings/GDP 1970-
90 
Sachs and Warner (1997)  CGB7090 
Tropical climate  Authors, 
 based on TROPICS in Sachs 
and Warner (1997)  
CLIMATE 
Democracy 1975  Barro (1997)  DEMOCRACY75 
Fertility rate in 1965 (log)  Barro and Lee (1994)  FERT65L 
Annual growth rate of PPP-adjusted real 
GDP per capita for 1965-90 
Sachs and Warner (1997)  GR6590 
PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita in 
1965 (log) 
Penn World Tables 5.6  LRGDPC65 
Openness to international trade 1965-90  Sachs and Warner (1997)  OPEN6590 
Life expectancy circa 1965 (log)  Barro and Lee (1994)  LLIFE65 
Institutional quality 1980  Sachs and Warner (1997)  ICRGE80 
Primary product exports/GDP 1970  Sachs and Warner (1997)  SXPR 
Labour force growth minus population 
growth 1965-90 
Sachs and Warner (1997)  GEAP-POP 
Male schooling (secondary plus higher) 
in 1965 
Barro and Lee (1996)  SHM25 
(= SYRM25 + HYRM25) 
Terms of trade growth 1965-90  Authors, 
Constructed from World Bank 
(2000). For missing data, 
World Tables 1992 and 1994 
were used for TOT70 and 
TOT90, respectively. 
TOTGR 
Ethno-linguistic diversity  Sachs and Warner (1997)  ETHLING 
Financial depth average 1965-90  Barro and Lee (1994)  LLY 
 
Note: We amended Sachs and Warner’s (1997) tropical climate variable so that it more 
accurately represents the proportion of the country that falls between the Tropics of Cancer and 
Capricorn. This involves some significant reclassifications including Hong Kong as 1 (not 0), 
Egypt as 0.2 (not 1) and Bangladesh as 0.5 (not 0.1), and rectifying some omissions in the Sachs 
and Warner’s dataset for this variable.   20
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